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We illustrate some of the unique ways in which hypnotic suggestions can be used to de-
velop and test models of psychopathology.  In particular, we describe a study of hypnotic 
hallucinations, focusing on its value for probing the underlying nature of hallucinations, 
including their neural underpinnings.  We discuss how this work led us to view OCD 
behaviour as having qualities opposite in some ways to those of hallucinations-an in-
sight that subsequently led to the development of a new theory of OCD, which we briefly 
review.  Finally, we describe an experimental test of the plausibility of this theory using 
appropriate hypnotic suggestions.
Introduction
Hypnosis has been used instrumentally to de-
velop and test models of a number of psychopa-
thologies.  In the 1960s, Reyher (1961, 1962) used 
hypnosis to experimentally evaluate the role of 
psychodynamic conflict and thereby induce ana-
logs of psychopathology.  Periodically over the 
years, hypnosis has been employed as a model 
for delusions (e.g., Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988; 
McConkey, Szeps, & Barnier, 2001), functional 
blindness (e.g., Bryant & McConkey, 1989, 1999; 
Sackheim, Nordlie & Gur, 1979), and functional 
memory disorders (e.g., Barnier, 2002; Kihlstrom 
& Schacter, 1995).  Zimbardo used hypnosis to 
evaluate a model of paranoia (Zimbardo, Ander-
son, & Kabat, 1981).  Recently, Oakley has used 
hypnosis to model functional paralysis (Halligan, 
Athwal, Oakley, & Frackowiak, 2000; Oakley, 
1999, 2006), and Barnier and her colleagues have 
used hypnosis to model identity and misidentifi-
cation delusions (Barnier et al., 2008; Cox & Bar-
nier, 2009).  Nonetheless, the instrumental use 
of hypnosis as an empirical approach to model 
psychopathology is hardly common, and so it is 
worthwhile to begin by considering the question: 
Why use hypnosis for this purpose?
One reason is that hypnotic phenomena have 
qualities that closely resemble some symptoms 
of psychopathology.  Appropriate suggestions 
in highly hypnotizable participants produce, to 
use John Kihlstrom’s words, “conviction border-
ing on delusion” and “involuntariness border-
ing on compulsion” (Kihlstrom, 2008, p. 21).  In 
addition, by using hypnosis we can produce the 
phenomena of interest on demand.  Rather than 
waiting for a patient to spontaneously experience 
a hallucination, we can generate one in the lab 
and study, for example, its associated brain activ-
ity (Oakley & Halligan, 2009).  Finally and most 
importantly, by using hypnosis we can indepen-
dently manipulate factors of putative importance 
to theories of psychopathology, thus exploring 
whether these factors have the role that a theory 
says they do.
To illustrate these themes, we will now high-
light some of our own work over the last decade. 
In this work, our use of hypnosis has evolved from 
modeling hallucinations to modeling compul-
sions, even as our thinking has interconnected the 
two conditions.
Study of auditory hallucina-
tions via neuroimaging
Highly hypnotizable participants undergoing the 
experience of a hallucination have a compelling 
experience of the reality of a given perception, 
even though the perceived stimulus is actually not 
present in the outside world.  Some of our work 
has addressed the issue of how such experiences 
can occur, and, more specifically, which brain 
mechanisms underlie such false convictions of 
reality.  This work also provides insights into the 
processes that normally provide the foundation 
for our sense of external reality, which may break 
down in some kinds of psychopathology.
With Ken Bowers and Claude Nahmias some 
years ago, we addressed these issues by conduct-
ing a positron emission tomography (PET) study 
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of hypnotic auditory hallucinations (Szechtman, 
Woody, Bowers, & Nahmias, 1998).  Our rationale 
for using hypnosis in this experiment was instru-
mental: we wanted to use hypnosis to facilitate 
the study of the nature of hallucinations, rather 
than focusing on the nature of hypnosis itself. 
Thus, our design compared two groups of highly 
hypnotizable participants: (1) carefully selected 
individuals shown to be consistently capable of 
producing vivid auditory hallucinations, and (2) 
individuals who were equally high in overall hyp-
notizability, but shown to be incapable of produc-
ing such hallucinations. 
After prescreening all participants for high 
hypnotizability on the Harvard Group Scale of 
Hypnotic Ability, Form A (Shor & Orne, 1962) 
and the Waterloo-Group C Scale of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility (WSGC; Bowers, 1993, 1998), we 
evaluated their capacities to experience vivid 
hallucinations in individual clinical assessments. 
Each assessment included a variety of hypnotical-
ly suggested hallucinations, such as music, voices, 
and singing.  Hallucinators and non-hallucinators 
differed not only during this assessment, but on 
two other occasions, i.e., whether or not they 
passed the auditory hallucination item during 
the WSGC; and whether or not they hallucinated 
during the PET study itself. 
It is important to point out that this type of 
design is different from the far more typical one 
that compares highly hypnotizable participants 
with their low-hypnotizable counterparts.  There 
are considerable individual differences in ability 
profiles among highly hypnotizable individuals, 
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Figure 1.  Right ventral anterior cingulate region activated in hallucinators by both hearing 
and hallucinating compared to both imagining and baseline conditions. Right panel: Projec-
tions of this region on sagittal (upper) and transverse (lower) MRI templates, with crosshairs 
at the maximum voxel (z = 4.60) located at the coordinates {6,48,0} according to the Talairach 
atlas (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988); the threshold for significant voxels was set at p = 0.001 
and the indicated region is comprised of 207 voxels.  Left panel: The adjusted rCBF response at 
{6,48,0} for each experimental condition (averaged across the two replications).  Reprinted with 
permission from Szechtman et al. (1998).
consistent with hypnotizability being a multidi-
mensional characteristic (Laurence, Beaulieu-
Prévost, & du Chéné, 2008; Woody & Barnier, 
2008; Woody, Barnier, & McConkey, 2005). 
Although the underlying causes for this multidi-
mensionality are not yet known, its implication 
for instrumental studies of uncommon phenom-
ena like hallucinations is very clear:  it is an error 
to consider all high-hypnotizable participants to 
be equivalent.  If we want to study hallucinations, 
we need to make sure we find a group of high-
hypnotizable participants who can actually hallu-
cinate (rather than, for example, simply imagine 
vividly).  In addition, in accordance with experi-
mental logic, the best control group for these 
hallucinators would be participants who are as 
much like them as possible in all other respects. 
This group comprises equally high-hypnotizable 
participants who cannot hallucinate (rather than 
low-hypnotizable participants).
Our experiment was designed to incorporate 
particular theory-based, within-subject com-
parisons.  Our theoretical framework derived 
from Bentall (1990), who conceptualized hallu-
cinations as internally generated events that are 
misattributed to an external source.  Accordingly, 
we asked the following question, Which brain 
regions are involved in distinguishing whether an 
auditory perception comes from the external world 
or not?  For this purpose, we measured changes in 
regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) under four 
conditions: (1) while resting; (2) while hearing a 
recorded message; (3) while imagining the same 
message; and (4) while hallucinating the message. 
With this design, we can answer the following 
question:  How is brain activation during hallu-
cination like hearing, but different from imagining 
(and baseline resting)?  [Note that rather than try-
ing to reduce a hypnotic phenomenon to an act 
of imagination, as in Spanos’ (1991) well-known 
work from a social-cognitive perspective, we 
were explicitly trying to contrast the two.]
Following a brief hypnotic induction, each 
participant was given the four conditions twice, 
the second time in reverse order.  In the hearing 
condition, participants were informed that a tape 
recorder would be turned on, and they were asked 
to pay attention to a recorded message.  This mes-
sage consisted of the phrase, “The man did not 
speak often, but when he did, it was worth hear-
ing what he had to say,” repeated several times. 
In the imagining condition, participants were in-
formed the tape recorder would not be turned on, 
and they were asked to imagine the same man’s 
voice repeating the same phrase over and over, 
as vividly as possible.  Finally, in the hallucina-
tion condition, participants were administered 
exactly the same instructions as for the hearing 
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condition — namely, that the tape recorder would 
be turned on, and they should pay attention to 
the recorded message.  But after the initial sound 
of the tape recorder being turned on, no mes-
sage was played.  There were no further sugges-
tions in this condition, and participants were not 
told that it had anything to do with hallucination. 
Following each trial, participants rated the exter-
nality of the sound (from 1, “entirely inside their 
own head,” to 10, “entirely external”) and its clar-
ity (from 1, “virtually inaudible,” to 10, “clear and 
vivid — as real as real”).
For the hallucinators, the re-experience of 
the taped message was apparently very compel-
ling (even though there was no sound).  In the 
debriefing, it proved impossible to convince some 
of them that the message had not actually been 
replayed.  In contrast, some of the non-hallucina-
tors were kind enough to let us know that there 
might possibly have been a problem with our tape 
recorder.  Because there has been so much em-
phasis in some circles on the role of expectancies 
in hypnotic responding (e.g., Benham, Woody, 
Wilson, & Nash, 2006; Lynn, Kirsch, & Hallquist, 
2008), it is interesting to note that both hallucina-
tors and non-hallucinators fully expected to hear 
the taped message again, but only the hallucina-
tors managed to hear it.
The method of Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(Friston, Frith, Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1991) en-
abled us to look for brain locations activated 
during hearing and hallucination but not during 
imagining and baseline.  For the eight hallucina-
tors, this four-fold contrast yielded the region of 
the right anterior cingulate (Brodmann area 32), 
as depicted in the right panel of Figure 1.
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Figure 2.  Association between adjusted rCBF response at {6,48,0} and ratings of externality 
and clarity of the voice in the hallucinating condition, p < 0.05.  The adjusted rCBF and the rat-
ings are both averaged for each participant across the two trials of the hallucination condition. 
Reprinted with permission from Szechtman et al. (1998).
As shown in the left panel of this figure, dur-
ing hallucination the adjusted blood flow (rCBF) 
in this region was as elevated above baseline as 
it was during hearing, whereas during imagining 
there was no such elevation. 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, rCBF 
response in this region during hallucination was 
very strongly related to hallucinators’ subjective 
ratings of externality (r = .95) and clarity (r = .85).
In contrast, for the six non-hallucinators, the 
same comparison of hearing and hallucination 
conditions with imaging and baseline revealed 
no significant activation in the right anterior cin-
gulate.  The difference between the hallucinators 
and the non-hallucinators at this site was statisti-
cally significant, which implies that activation of 
the right anterior cingulate is crucially implicat-
ed in the experience of a hallucination.  For the 
non-hallucinators, the fourfold contrast did yield 
significant activation in one region, (the auditory 
association cortex: right Brodmann area 22), and 
the non-hallucinators also differed significantly 
from the hallucinators at this site.  This difference 
between the two groups implies that activation 
of the auditory cortex alone is not sufficient for 
a hallucination.
The results of some comparisons between 
pairs of conditions helped flesh out these differ-
ences.  The comparison of hearing to hallucina-
tion conditions showed activation over a much 
wider area of the temporal lobes in the halluci-
nators than in the non-hallucinators.  Thus, with 
regard to the auditory cortex, the hallucination 
task was less similar to hearing for the hallucina-
tors than for the non-hallucinators.  In addition, 
the comparison of hearing to baseline showed 
significant differences in the brain activation of 
hallucinators and non-hallucinators.  Hearing 
activated more extensive regions (including the 
auditory cortex and the right rostral anterior cin-
gulate) for the hallucinators than for the non-hal-
lucinators.  In this regard, it is interesting to note 
that the pattern of brain activity during hearing 
shown by non-hallucinators was essentially the 
same as that shown by unselected, unhypnotized 
participants (Szechtman et al., 1992).  Thus, hal-
lucinators appear to show an unusual tendency to 
process auditory events in more extensive brain 
regions than other people.  This tendency is con-
sistent with the research on individuals with “fan-
tasy-prone personalities” (Wilson & Barber, 1983; 
Lynn & Rhue, 1988), who are highly hypnotizable, 
hallucinate readily, and show high sensitivity to 
sensory stimuli.
The main result of this study, implicating the 
anterior cingulate in the experience of a halluci-
nation, fits intriguingly with a variety of other re-
search findings.  Hallucinations in schizophrenic 
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patients appear to be associated with activity in 
the anterior cingulate, although perhaps some-
what more dorsally than in our hypnotic hallu-
cinators (Cleghorn et al., 1990, 1992; Silbersweig 
et al., 1995).  In addition, surgical lesions in the 
anterior cingulate can produce faulty reality mon-
itoring, in which imagined events are believed to 
be real (Whitty & Lewin, 1957).  Finally, the criti-
cal role of the anterior cingulate in our study is 
consistent with many other findings concerning 
the neural mechanisms underlying hypnotic ef-
fects (Oakley, 2008).  For example, neuroimaging 
studies of hypnotic analgesia implicate the ante-
rior cingulate (e.g., Crawford, Gur, Skolnick, Gur, 
& Benson, 1993; Crawford et al., 1998; Rainville, 
Duncan, Price, Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997).
But what can activation of the anterior cingu-
late tell us specifically about the underlying nature 
of hallucinations?  The anterior cingulate serves 
as a critical interface between emotional and at-
tentional systems inasmuch as it is closely associ-
ated with emotional experience and regulation-
especially the assessment of the motivational 
significance of stimuli (Damasio, 1997; Devinsky, 
Morrell, & Vogt, 1995).  It is also an essential com-
ponent of the anterior attentional system (Posner 
& Petersen, 1990; Morecraft, Geula, & Mesulam, 
1993).  Thus, the interconnection between emo-
tion and attention seems strongly implicated.
The line of interpretation we favour links our 
research to ideas that Rapoport (1989, p. 240) has 
termed the “biology of knowing” and Damasio 
(1994, p. 196) the “neurobiology of rationality.” 
Similar to these researchers, we proposed that 
what may be necessary for a convincing subjec-
tive sense of the reality of some perceptions is a 
crucial “feeling of knowing.”  By affecting such 
feelings of knowing, hypnosis may produce a dis-
sociation between subjective convictions and re-
ality (Woody & Szechtman, 2007).
Cognitive psychologists have used the term 
“feeling of knowing” to designate the intuitive 
sense of knowing something, even though at 
the moment it cannot be brought to mind (e.g., 
Nelson, Gerler, & Narens, 1984).  More generally, 
what one “knows” subjectively may be quite dis-
tinct from what one knows objectively — for ex-
ample, one continues to experience the subjective 
conviction that one of the two lines in the Müller-
Lyer illusion is obviously longer than the other, 
even as one verifies objectively that they have the 
same length.  
One effect of hypnosis is to foster such sub-
jective feelings of knowing, and these subjective 
convictions may then serve as the kernel around 
which plausible content is readily elaborated. 
Thus, with regard to a hypnotic hallucination, 
once the conviction arises that something is out 
there, the situation provides very clear expecta-
tions (i.e., the taped message) through which the 
accompanying percept may be constructed.
Other hypnotic phenomena may also read-
ily arise from alterations in feelings of know-
ing.  In particular, negative hallucinations can 
be explained as stemming from the absence of 
a feeling of knowing.  To illustrate, in one study 
(Spanos, Flynn, & Gabora, 1989), highly hypno-
tizable participants were given the suggestion 
that they would see only a black sheet of paper 
and then shown a clear “8.”  Some participants 
reported seeing nothing on the paper, but when 
later pressed by a second experimenter almost all 
of them correctly guessed what the number was. 
Spanos (1991) interpreted these results in terms 
of compliance in the service of playing a social 
role, whereby these participants were being “less 
than forthright” (p. 337) in their initial claim of 
not seeing anything.  Nonetheless, an alternative 
interpretation related to hypnotically altered feel-
ings of knowing is that these participants’ behav-
iour was fully consistent with not feeling as if they 
knew.  Thus, hypnosis may provide particular ac-
cess to the subjective, rather than rational, under-
pinnings of mental processes.
If we regard alteration in feelings of knowing 
as a general explanation for hypnotic responses, 
an interesting question is what the non-hallucina-
tors in our study (who were equally high in over-
all hypnotizability) may lack, so that they do not 
hallucinate.  Because our study was about halluci-
nations, rather than hypnotizability per se, it did 
not directly address this question.  Nonetheless, 
one possibility is that there are distinct classes 
of feelings of knowing, and highly hypnotizable 
individuals differ in their respective propensities 
to alter these different types of feeling (Woody & 
Szechtman, 2000).  For instance, the crucial feel-
ing in hypnotic motor responses, which is invol-
untariness, is quite different from the crucial feel-
ing in a hypnotic hallucination, which is the sense 
of external reality (see also Woody & McConkey, 
2003).
The emotive underpinnings 
of reality
It has long been pointed out that such subjective 
intuitions about reality may have a crucial role in 
mental life.  For example, Jaspers (1963, p. 93–94) 
made the following observation:  
Conceptual reality carries conviction only 
if a kind of presence is experienced. . . . 
Our attention gets drawn to it because it 
can be disturbed pathologically and so we 
appreciate that it exists. 
Müller-Lyer Illusion 
The lower horizontal line 
looks subjectively longer 
than the upper one, even 
after one has verified with a 
ruler that they are the same 
length.
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In its inner nature, belief, or the sense of re-
ality, is a sort of feeling more allied to the 
emotions than anything else. . . . The true 
opposites of belief, psychologically consid-
ered, are doubt and inquiry, not disbelief.  In 
both these states the content of our mind 
is in unrest, and the emotion engendered 
thereby is, like the emotion of belief itself, 
perfectly distinct, but perfectly indescrib-
able in words.  Both sorts of emotion may 
be pathologically exalted.  (James. 1890, p. 
283–284, italics in the original)
Consistent with James’ opposition of the feel-
ing of belief versus the feeling of doubt and in-
quiry, we were particularly intrigued with the idea 
that obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) has a 
striking similarity to a negative hallucination. 
Specifically, Rapoport (1989, p. 96) has conceptu-
alized OCD as a condition in which crucial feel-
ings of knowing are absent:
A major feature, and a strange one, of 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder is the 
inability to be reassured by the sens-
es.  Obsessives have lost their ability to 
“know” certain simple things that we all 
take for granted.  [These patients] are ask-
ing “How do you know” about things that 
we find ourselves hard put to explain: Is 
the grass really green?  Are my eyes blue?  
“Why,” I say, “we just know, that’s all.”
Motor & 
Visceral 
Output 
Security- 
Related 
Programs 
Yedasentience 
Stimuli, 
Context, 
Plans 
Appraisal 
of 
Potential 
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X 
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Security 
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Anxiety 
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Figure 3.  A conceptual model of the Security Motivation System and sites of dysfunction producing OCD.  Solid arrows 
indicate excitatory and dashed arrows inhibitory stimulation, respectively.  Yedasentience output does not act on environmental 
input but rather on the Appraisal of Potential Danger and the Security Motivation components to inhibit their activity.  Expo-
sure through motor output to Safety Cues also provides inhibitory stimulation to Appraisal of Potential Danger.  Reprinted with 
permission from Szechtman & Woody (2004).
Indeed, difficulty in accepting the simplest 
observations led the French to call OCD the 
“doubting disease.”  Rapoport argued that OCD 
patients’ perceptions, although objectively sound, 
are not accompanied by the subjective convic-
tions that would normally be present: 
[They] appear to say “knowledge comes 
from the senses only”; therefore, the test 
of . . . truth will be in what they can hear, 
see, and touch.  Hence the doorknob 
must be turned again and again; the light 
switched on and off, on and off.  These 
acts bring immediate information, yet it 
doesn’t get through.  They can’t say, “Yes, 
I have checked this out and now I know 
that the door is locked.” (Rapoport, 1989, 
p. 238) 
To summarize, in hallucination, the external 
stimulus is absent, yet the feeling of knowing is 
present; whereas in OCD, the external stimulus 
is present, yet the feeling of knowing is absent. 
That is, despite sensory evidence that most people 
would find logically compelling, the OCD patient 
is not convinced because, we argue, he or she can-
not generate a feeling of knowing.  (For a discus-
sion of how the absence of a feeling of knowing 
may also explain other psychopathologies, such 
as Capgras delusion, see Woody & Szechtman, 
2000.)
Yedasentience 
From the Hebrew yeda, 
knowing, and Latin sentire, 
to feel ; an internally gener-
ated feeling of knowing
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A new theory of ocd
The power of subjective, feeling-based knowing to 
overrule rational, logical knowing is dramatically 
evident in the lives of some people who, ironi-
cally, are pre-eminent for their rational achieve-
ments.  Kurt Gödel, the eminent 20th century 
mathematician, sought to live life as a “quest for 
rationality in all things” (Dawson, Jr., 1999, p. 76). 
In his revolutionary “incompleteness” theorem, 
he used masterful logic to reach conclusions that 
astounded his contemporaries. Yet in his personal 
life, this brilliant logician was plagued with sense-
less obsessions about the possibility of being ac-
cidentally poisoned by something in his food or 
by gasses coming out of his refrigerator.  To coax 
him to eat, his wife had first to taste his food her-
self.  When she became ill and unable to continue 
in this role, his obsessions were so severe that he 
inadvertently starved himself to death.
Brainstem 
Output Network 
SNpc 
SMA/PMC/MC 
VA-VL Thalamus 
GPi-SNr 
Motor Striatum 
GPe/STN 
Security-Related 
Programs Loop 
VTA 
HPC 
AM BNST 
MD Thalamus 
Ventral Pallidum 
Limbic Striatum 
GPe/STN 
MOPFC 
Appraisal of Potential 
Danger Loop 
Security Motivation 
and Affect Loop 
Sensory 
Information 
Figure 4.  A neural circuit model of Security Motivation System.  Each of the 4 distinct subcircuits (loops) subserves one of the functional components in 
Figure 3 and is identified by corresponding colour.  The dashed line indicates possible sites of yedasentience feedback inhibition.  Abbreviations: AM, amygdala; 
BNST, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis; GPe = external segment of the globus pallidus; GPi, internal segment of the globus pallidus; HPC, hippocampus; MC, 
motor cortex; MD, thalamus, mediodorsal thalamic nucleus; MOPFC, medial prefrontal cortex and orbital prefrontal cortex; PMC, premotor cortex; SMA, 
supplementary motor area; SNpc, substantia nigra pars compacta; SNr, substantia nigra pars reticulata; STN, subthalamic nucleus; VA, ventroanterior thalamic 
nucleus; VL, ventrolateral thalamic nucleus; VTA, ventral tegmental area.   Reprinted with permission from Szechtman & Woody (2004).
Another interesting example is Samuel 
Johnson, the 18th century writer and outstand-
ing Enlightenment figure, whose life’s work was 
“in defense of reason against the wiles of un-
checked fancy and emotion” (Mahoney, 2000). 
Nonetheless, his personal life was full of inexpli-
cable compulsions, such as needing to touch ev-
ery post in a street or step exactly in the centre 
of every paving-stone.  If one of these senseless 
acts had not been done exactly right, his friends 
had to wait while he went back to fix it (Stephen, 
1900).
Such obsessions and compulsions can occur 
in a variety of disorders, but they are the hallmark 
of OCD.  Partly as an outgrowth of our reflec-
tions on the foregoing work with hypnotic hal-
lucinations, we were led to advance a new theory 
about the psychological processes that underlie 
OCD (Szechtman & Woody, 2004; Woody & 
Szechtman, 2005).  In brief, we hypothesized that 
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such symptoms are caused by the inability to gen-
erate the normal “feeling of knowing” that would 
otherwise signal task completion.  For example, 
even though compulsive hand washers know ob-
jectively that their hands look clean, they cannot 
readily generate the subjective conviction that 
they are truly clean, and so they continue to wash.
More specifically, we proposed that the symp-
toms of OCD stem from the dysfunction of a 
biologically primal security motivation system. 
Activation of this system, which originally evolved 
to manage protection from potential harm to self 
and others (Szechtman & Woody, 2004; Woody 
& Szechtman, 2011), gives rise to OCD concerns 
and behaviours, such as cleanliness and wash-
ing.  In addition, the security motivation system 
differs from most other motivational systems in 
that it is open-ended, with no terminating signal 
in the environment.  Instead, the engagement in 
security-related activities in themselves normally 
generates the terminator signal, which is experi-
enced as a feeling of knowing.  For example, when 
people wash their hands in response to potential 
danger of contamination, what normally termi-
nates this activity is not that their hand washing 
has met certain logical, objective criteria; instead, 
they stop when it feels right and done.  However, 
OCD patients have a crucially reduced capacity 
to generate this endogenous emotive terminator.
In short, what is missing for an OCD patient 
is a particular feeling of knowing that serves as 
an essential terminator of a species-specific mo-
tivation concerned with protection from poten-
tial danger.  We gave this specific emotive signal 
the name yedasentience, from the Hebrew yeda, 
knowing, and Latin sentire, to feel, and stated our 
core hypothesis as follows:
An internally generated “feeling of know-
ing” (termed “yedasentience”) provides 
a phenomenological sign of goal-attain-
ment and has as its consequence the ter-
mination of thoughts, ideas or actions 
motivated by concerns of harm to self or 
others.  Failure to generate or experience 
this feeling produces symptoms charac-
teristic of OCD (Szechtman & Woody, 
2004, p. 116).
Figure 3 lays out our conceptual model of 
OCD as a dysfunction of security motivation, 
consisting of 4 major functional components 
(shown across the middle of the figure) and 3 ma-
jor routes of feedback (shown above and below).  
The first component, Appraisal of Potential 
Danger, evaluates environmental stimuli in the 
context of the organism’s plans.  If results indi-
cate a potential threat to self or others, an excit-
atory signal is passed to the second component, 
Security Motivation, which generates a set of co-
ordinated outputs that serve to energize and fo-
cus the person’s actions.  One of these outputs, 
labeled Anxiety, provides positive feedback to the 
Appraisal component.  This feedback signal pro-
vides a further interoceptive cue indicating po-
tential danger and forms part of a loop that acts to 
sustain the appraisal.  Another output is an excit-
atory signal to a third major component, Security 
Related Programs, which co-ordinates and ex-
ecutes species-typical motor and cognitive pro-
grams for protection from potential danger such 
as washing or checking.  Performance of these 
activated programs generates the next function-
al component, Motor and Visceral Output.  This 
output provides the feedback, via Yedasentience, 
which is the stop signal that shuts down the activ-
ity of the Security Motivation and the Appraisal 
subsystems.  Motor Output also has a possible 
effect on the Appraisal subsystem through the 
enhancement of Safety Cues, a slower mode of in-
hibitory feedback due to the protracted half-life 
of Security Motivation once it is activated.  
In the figure, the X’s on the paths show po-
tential sites of blockage that would interfere with 
the feedback of the Yedasentience signal to the 
Security Motivation subsystem.  Without the 
Yedasentience feedback, species typical behav-
iours such as washing and checking would fail to 
inhibit the subsystem’s stimulation of security-
related programs, and thus these programs would 
persist for abnormal lengths of time.  Likewise, 
because of the lack of the Yedasentience signal 
to the Appraisal subsystem, performance of spe-
cies typical behaviours would have an abnormally 
weak corrective effect on perceptions of potential 
danger.  Thus, the blockages indicated by the X’s 
would yield the behavioural profile of OCD.  
Figure 4 shows our proposal for a neuroana-
tomical circuit of the security motivation system. 
It consists of cascading circuits that subserve the 
four functional components, labeled correspond-
ingly as the Appraisal of Potential Danger Loop, 
Security Motivation and Affect Loop, Security 
Related Programs Loop, and Brainstem Output 
Network.  Although most of the details of this 
neural model are not central to the present ar-
ticle, the model does usefully illustrate how our 
theory can be integrated with a wide range of 
work in behavioural neuroscience (see Woody & 
Szechtman, 2011, for further information).
Given the crucial role of the anterior cingu-
late in our hypnotic hallucinations experiment 
and the theme of feelings of knowing to link hal-
lucinations and OCD, it is worth noting that in 
Figure 4 the anterior cingulate is included in the 
Appraisal of Potential Danger Loop, as part of the 
medial prefrontal cortex and orbital prefrontal 
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cortex (MOPFC).  Moreover, Fiddick (2011) has 
reviewed a wide range of research to argue that 
the anterior cingulate plays a primary role in the 
assessment of potential threat (as distinguished 
from immediate hazards).  With regard to OCD 
more specifically, one intriguing line of evidence 
is that cingulotomy has been used as an effective 
treatment for otherwise untreatable, severe OCD 
(Dougherty et al., 2002).
To summarize briefly, our theory posits that 
individuals with OCD suffer from the inability to 
turn off security motivation through the normal 
route of performing specific security related be-
haviours.  These patients cannot readily generate 
the crucial emotional sense of knowing that, for 
example, their hands are clean, even though they 
may know this intellectually.
Because we approached OCD from a very dif-
ferent starting point than other psychopatholo-
gists, our theory is quite distinct from previous 
theories of OCD in several major respects.  In 
particular, it proposes the existence of a special 
motivational system focusing on management of 
potential danger; it emphasizes the role of preven-
tative behaviour and the primal feelings normally 
engendered by such behaviour; and its core hy-
pothesis about OCD is a deficiency in the ability 
to terminate an activated state of security moti-
vation through engagement in security-related 
behaviour.  Other theories of OCD tend to focus 
mainly on cognitions as causes of the disorder, 
and they tend to focus more on the hypothesis 
that OCD represents a starting problem, in which 
individuals are too sensitive to particular cues 
(e.g., Purdon & Clark, 1999; Rachman, 1997).
Study of the security motiva-
tion theory using hypnosis
Recently, we have been engaged in several dif-
ferent approaches to testing this theory.  One of 
them is of particular interest in the present con-
text because it involves the instrumental use of 
hypnosis (Woody, Lewis, Snider, Grant, Kamath, 
& Szechtman, 2005).  In this study, we wanted to 
evaluate the question of whether dysfunction of 
a feeling of knowing is a plausible mechanism 
for OCD behaviour.  Our approach was to block 
this feeling hypnotically and see if the blockage 
produces OCD-like behaviour — specifically, pro-
longed washing.  In other words, can we tempo-
rarily create in non-patient individuals OCD-like 
behaviour?
As an aside, we had some difficulty in obtain-
ing ethical approval for this study.  The ethics 
board had two concerns:  first, they thought the 
study would not work; and second, they worried 
that we might produce lasting OCD in some of 
our participants.  Both of these concerns proved 
to be incorrect.
In this experiment, we compared high hyp-
notizable participants, who had scored 9 or 
above on the Waterloo–Stanford Group C Scale 
(Bowers, 1993, 1998), to low hypnotizable coun-
terparts, who had scored 3 or less.  Because block-
ing changes in feeling should only be possible for 
high-hypnotizable participants, the lows serve as 
an important control for demand effects.
One of the experimentally manipulated fac-
tors involved eliciting the sense of potential 
harm.  We did this by asking participants to think 
of something that could be contaminated with 
germs and imagine that they had touched it.  In 
contrast, participants in the control condition 
imagined an innocuous activity, such as reading 
a book or watching TV.  
The other experimentally manipulated fac-
tor involved blocking the changes in feeling that 
would normally occur during washing.  We did 
this with the following suggestion (Woody et al., 
2005):
As you know, usually when you wash your 
hands there is a feeling of satisfaction that 
comes with it. . . .  However, now when you 
wash your hands, you will find that you do 
not experience that feeling of satisfaction.  
There will be a lack of satisfaction as you 
wash your hands.
The main dependent variable was the dura-
tion of subsequent hand-washing behaviour. 
Hand washing took place at a sink installed with 
an automatic faucet and an automatic soap dis-
penser, both activated by proximity of the hands. 
Figure 5.  Adjusted Mean Washing Duration as a Function of Hypnotizability, Potential 
Harm, and Blocking of Yedasentience. .Note: mean with an asterisk is significantly different 
from every other mean, p < 0.05.  The combination of Potential Harm and blocked Yedasen-
tience yielded prolonged hand washing in the highly hypnotizable participants, compared to all 
other conditions.  Reprinted with permission from Woody et al. (2005).
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Before hypnosis, participants had engaged in an 
initial hand washing to familiarize themselves 
with the sink set-up.  A video camera mounted 
over the sink recorded the number and duration 
of all washing episodes.
The security-motivation hypothesis of OCD 
implies that the combination of potential harm 
and blocked yedasentience should yield pro-
longed washing.  In addition, because only high 
hypnotizables should be capable of blocking ye-
dasentience, our prediction was a three-way in-
teraction involving potential harm, blocking of 
change in feeling, and hypnotizability.
In the results, this interaction was indeed 
highly significant.  Figure 5 shows the corre-
sponding means.
Blocking yedasentience significantly in-
creased wash duration only in the predicted cell, 
where potential harm had been suggested to 
high-hypnotizable participants (the bar to the far 
right).  In contrast, blocking yedasentience had 
negligible and insignificant effects on wash dura-
tion when potential harm was not suggested to 
high-hypnotizable participants and whether or 
not potential harm was suggested to low-hypno-
tizable participants.  This pattern of results con-
firms the main hypothesis of the study.
It turns out that participants are quite good 
at vividly imagining having touched something 
that may be contaminated.  On five-point scales 
we had them rate the levels of disgust and anxiety 
they had felt after being asked to think of contact 
with a potentially contaminating stimulus.  Both 
high- and low-hypnotizable participants reported 
substantially and significantly elevated disgust 
and anxiety, compared to the control condition. 
A significant Hypnotizability by Potential Harm 
interaction also indicated that high-hypnotizable 
participants responded somewhat more strongly 
to the imagined stimulus.
Also on a five-point scale, participants rated 
the level of satisfaction they had experienced 
when subsequently washing their hands.  Analysis 
of these data yielded a significant Hypnotizability 
by Yedasentience interaction, and Figure 6 shows 
the associated means.  
For the high-hypnotizable participants, 
blocking yedasentience significantly reduced 
their experience of satisfaction while washing 
their hands; whereas for the low-hypnotizable 
participants, this effect was negligible and statis-
tically insignificant.  Thus, as anticipated, only the 
high-hypnotizable participants could effectively 
enact the suggestion to block yedasentience.
The experiment also included a more covert 
index of how participants were feeling:  namely, 
their heart rate.  We submitted the heart rate data 
to a mixed-model analysis of covariance, using 
baseline heart rate as the covariate.  In addition 
to the between-subject factors, there was also the 
within-subject factor of Trials, with three times 
of measurement: Trial 1 was measured just after 
the hypnotic induction; Trial 2 was measured just 
after the suggestion of an emotional experience 
(e.g., a situation of potential harm); and Trial 3 
was measured just after the completion of hand 
washing.  The analysis yielded a significant two-
way interaction of Trials by Potential Harm, and 
Figure 7 shows the relevant means.  
The mean for Trial 2 (Before Wash) in the po-
tential-harm suggested condition is significantly 
higher than each of the other means, which in 
turn do not differ significantly from one another. 
Thus, the suggestion of an experience of potential 
harm increased participants’ heart rates, whereas 
the control suggestion of a neutral experience did 
not.  In addition, this potential-harm-related in-
crease returned to baseline once the participants 
had been allowed to wash their hands.  (Note 
that it makes sense for the experimental factor of 
blocking yedasentience not to be involved in this 
effect:  its manipulation took place between Trial 
2 and Trial 3, and heart rate at Trial 3 was mea-
sured after the completion of handwashing, when 
participants had been able to take as long as they 
wanted to clean their hands.)
In summary, all participants, regardless of 
their level of hypnotizability, tended to react to 
their images of potential harm with disgust and 
anxiety, as well as elevated heart rate and in-
creased washing time, and this elevated heart rate 
Figure 6.  Satisfaction as a Function of Hypnotizability and Blocking of Yedasentience. Note: 
mean with an asterisk is significantly different from the adjacent mean for No Blocking of Ye-
dasentience, p < 0.05.  Blocking Yedasentience significantly reduced self-ratings of satisfac-
tion during the hand-washing in the high-hypnotizable group, but not in the low-hypnotizable 
group.  Reprinted with permission from Woody et al. (2005).
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returned to baseline when they had washed their 
hands.  These self-report, heart rate, and behav-
ioural data indicate that participants experienced 
a situation of potential harm in a vivid and involv-
ing way, which is an essential precondition for 
evaluating the effects of the subsequent blockage 
of yedasentience.
For the high-hypnotizable participants, the 
yedasentience-blocking suggestion reduced their 
rated satisfaction from hand-washing and, more 
importantly, had the predicted effect of substan-
tially prolonging the duration of their hand-
washing in the predicted condition of potential 
harm.  This crucial result lends credence to our 
hypothesis that a deficit in the feeling of knowing 
is a plausible explanation for OCD-like behav-
iour.  In addition, the result laid the groundwork 
for our subsequent experiments, not using hyp-
nosis, that have established the properties of the 
Security Motivation System (Hinds et al., 2010).
Conclusion
To close, let’s return to the overarching theme of 
using hypnosis to develop and test models of psy-
chopathology.  We have seen that by using hypno-
sis in appropriately preselected participants, it is 
quite possible to dissociate subjective experience 
from the objective input available to the senses. 
In addition, independently manipulating these 
subjective convictions can provide important 
clues about their role in various kinds of psycho-
pathology, for symptoms as diverse as hallucina-
tions and compulsive behaviour.
Skeptics may question whether such hypnot-
ic recreations of clinical disorders really capture 
something about the essence of the disorders, 
rather than merely imitating their surface fea-
tures.  To some extent, this skepticism may stem 
from lack of knowledge about hypnosis and a 
poorly informed suspicion that hypnotic respons-
es may merely be faking.  Recent, high profile 
work on the neural mechanisms underlying hyp-
notic effects (e.g., Cojan et al., 2009; Mendelsohn, 
Chalamish, Solomonovich, & Dudai, 2008) will 
likely help to dispel some of this skepticism.
There is a broader kind of skepticism that can 
be expressed as follows:  How can we ever be sure 
that a hypnotic model fully replicates the clinical 
condition it is modeling?  This concern, we believe, 
stems from a misunderstanding of what a model 
is.  Indeed, the same misunderstanding occurs 
in response to animal models of psychopathol-
ogy (Szechtman & Eilam, 2005).  Chapanis (1961) 
pointed out that any model is “only an analogy, 
a statement that in some ways the thing mod-
eled behaves ‘like this’” (p. 188). Even an excel-
lent model is only a likeness, not a replica.  For 
example, there are many aspects of the hypnotic 
hallucinations in our experiment that are unlike 
schizophrenic hallucinations, such as their elicit-
ing conditions and content.  Likewise, the hyp-
notic suggestions in our washing experiment do 
not come close to fully reproducing OCD.   Given 
these unavoidable limitations, Chapanis argued 
that models should be evaluated differently from 
theories: “Models, in a word, are judged by cri-
teria of usefulness; theories, by criteria of truth-
fulness” (p. 119).  Good models need to be gen-
erative, rather than true; they need to stimulate 
novel insights and better research.
With this perspective in mind, we can of-
fer a couple of suggestions about using hypnotic 
models:
1. Pose clear, specific research questions 
that are plausibly addressed by the mod-
el in question.  For example, each of the 
models covered in this article was guided 
by a central, very specific research ques-
tion.  Because a model is never a full 
substitute for the phenomenon being 
modeled, there are likely many other im-
portant questions that a particular model 
cannot plausibly address.
2. Keep in mind that “the worst error 
committed in the name of models is to 
forget that at best a model represents only 
Figure 7.  Heart Rate as a Function of Time of Measurement and Potential Harm.  Note: 
mean with an asterisk is significantly different from every other mean, p < 0.05.  The suggestion 
of Potential Harm increased participants’ heart rates compared to the control suggestion.  This 
increase dissipated once the participants had washed their hands.  Reprinted with permission 
from Woody et al. (2005).
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a part — and usually only a small part — of 
the thing being modeled” (Chapanis, 1961, 
p. 126).  Experimental results from a hyp-
notic model need to be evaluated as part 
of a fuller picture of converging evidence 
collected in other ways.  
Nonetheless, carefully crafted hypnotic sug-
gestions can serve to manipulate theoretically im-
portant factors that are difficult to manipulate in 
other ways.  For example, in our washing study, 
the yedasentience-blocking suggestion served, in 
effect, as a temporary and reversible “lesion,” cor-
responding to the hypothesized blockage in the 
theoretical model, as shown in Figure 3.  Because a 
more direct manipulation of such a blockage may 
be impractical, hypnosis may provide a neurosci-
ence tool of considerable potential importance.
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